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INTRODUCTION

Disclosure is one of the central cornerstones of federal securities law.
For a number of years, the primary focus of disclosure was directed to
the public offering process. More recently, however, disclosure to the
trading markets has achieved equal prominence. There has also been a
growing recognition that investors need the benefit of forward-looking
information. Not only has there been historical reluctance-now fast
disappearing---to the use of forwarding-looking information, but the
explosion of securities fraud lawsuits has also materially inhibited the
use of forecasts and projections. This Article will examine recent
developments in disclosure including current practices involving analysts,
T + 3, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, and the use of forward-looking
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information, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.
I.

CURRENT PRACTICES OF INVOLVING ANALYSTS IN PUBLIC
OFFERINGS

A.

Background

Communication between issuer and analyst serves a significant market
function in ensuring dissemination of information to the marketplace.
As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is
significantly enhanced by [analysts'] initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information and thus the analysts' work redounds to the benefit of all
investors." 1
The benefits of issuer-analyst dialogue do not accrue solely to the
investing public. The benefits to an issuer of communication with
analysts, particularly in the context of an offering, are many. Issueranalyst interplay, however, has been described "as a fencing match
conducted on a tightrope,"2 and, unless, artfully managed can result in
both civil and criminal sanctions. For example, selective disclosure of
material information to an analyst may be viewed as unlawful tipping in
violation of Rule lOb-5 3 and thereby create a duty to make disclosure
of the information to the public generally. Additionally, information
conveyed to analysts about fluid business situations can tum out to be
misleading and the practice of reviewing or correcting analysts' reports
might make issuers responsible for the accuracy of the entire report and
establish a duty to keep the information current.
Current analysis of regulation of information stemming from nonpublic
sources often centers around Dirks v. SEC,4 wherein the Supreme Court
attempted to craft a line between permissible and impermissible
disclosure. In Dirks, Raymond Dirks, a well-known investment analyst,
was informed by a former employee of Equity Financing Corporation
that the company was involved in massive financial fraud. Dirks
investigated the allegations and exposed the company's fraud, but not
before revealing the company's wrongdoings to his own clientele. The
SEC concluded that "[i]n tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty

I. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,658 n.17 (1983) (quoting 21 SEC Docket 1401,
1406 ( 1981 )).
2. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.!0b-5 (1996).
4. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving confidential
information from [Equity Funding] insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who
receive non-public, material information from insiders become 'subject
to the same duty as [the] insiders."' 5 As noted by the Court, the SEC's
theory of liability was "rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions
require equal information among all traders."6
The Court, however, rejected the notion that all traders must enjoy
equal information before trading and ruled that those who receive
material nonpublic information from insiders are not banned from
trading unless ( l) the insider breached a fiduciary duty for personal gain,
and (2) the recipient knew or should have known of the breach. 7
Despite the Court's efforts to establish a clear line between permissible
and impermissible disclosure, the SEC has continued to push for equal
information among all market participants and has continued to bring
enforcement actions because of selective disclosure, relying on theory
which substantially dilutes the potency of Dirks. 8 On the civil side,
issuers have been sued by investors claiming entanglement between
issuer and analyst and the failure of the issuer to update analysts'
reports. Issuer and analyst have also faced a series ofrecent class action
suits, wherein investors claim that issuer and analyst defraud investors
by issuing overly optimistic research reports, thereby manipulating the
issuer's stock price subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO).
In the face of an erosion of Dirks and continued SEC enforcement for
selective disclosure, as well as new entanglement theory, it is difficult
to offer precise guidance as to an appropriate level of discourse between
issuer and analyst, and, indeed, it is tempting to suggest that analysts
should take greater refuge behind a "Chinese wall." However, as argued
below, the benefit from issuer-analyst dialogue in the context of an
offering outweighs the risks inherent in such relationships, particularly
for issuers making an initial public offering.

5. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)).
6. Id. at 657.
7. Id. at 659.
8. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: Shifting Standards for
Tipper-Tippee Liability, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 23.
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B.

Analysts Involved in Initial Public Offerings
I.

Benefits of Analyst Involvement

In many ways the analyst is more indispensable to an issuer in the
context of an IPO, as the public has no baseline from which informed
investment decision-making can be made. Issuers generally recognize
this and, indeed, often select an underwriter who has a known analyst.
Moreover, the analyst is frequently involved in the offering process.
Analysts, however, aside from getting a company's name in play, can
also play a major role in an underwriter's due diligence process by
identifying weaknesses in product, management, or business strategies
because the analyst knows the industry and the competition. The analyst
can also advise as to how a company's strengths and weaknesses should
be disclosed in the company's prospectus.
More significant is the analyst's involvement in developing earnings
projections. As one commentator has pointed out:
[I]nstitutional customers, in particular, will not buy !PO shares without
[earnings] estimates. . . . Estimates therefore are provided orally to investors,
either at road shows or by the sales force on the telephone. The issuer typically
will not take responsibility for these estimates, leaving it in many cases to the
investment bankers working on the !PO to supply estimates based on
discussions with the issuer and access to internal projections. Investment
bankers, however, are not always experienced in coming up with earnings
estimates, and salespersons and customers alike may regard such estimates as
"tainted" ....
The analyst, on the other hand, is experienced in coming up with earnings
estimates and has a track record of credibility with salespeople and customers.
The analyst also is more likely to identify unrealistic assumptions built into the
issuer's internal projections. For this reason, analysts are increasingly permitted
access to the issuer's internal projections .... 9

Because of the importance of analysts to the offering process,
underwriters are often selected to lead an offering based on the ability
or reputation of the firm's analysts. Of course, this is a two-way street,
and analysts may be more willing to cover a particular company if the
analyst's firm is selected to manage the underwriting.

2.

Costs of Analyst Involvement

Once the offering is completed, the analyst generally publishes a
research report on the issuer subsequent to the "cooling down" period.

9. Joseph E. McLaughlin, The Changing Role of the Securities Analyst in Initial
Public Offerings, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1994, at 6-7.
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It is at this point that issuer and analyst alike generally are concerned
that the analyst is "tainted" or possesses material nonpublic information,
having participated in the due diligence process. It is also at this point
that issuer and analyst risk enforcement by the SEC as well as civil suit.
The SEC, as discussed below, has expanded the "personal benefits"
test established by the Dirks Court and has argued that even enhancement to reputation which does not result in pecuniary benefit is sufficient
for a finding of insider trading. To our knowledge, the SEC has not
prosecuted analysts on this theory.
Issuers also face exposure to claims based on entanglement.
Traditionally, entanglement theory holds that if a company puts its
imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on an analyst's report, the company
will be deemed to have adopted the report, will be responsible for its
accuracy, and will have a duty to update. Recently, a new form of
entanglement theory has emerged. Plaintiffs have brought class action
suits alleging that analysts and their firms have defrauded investors by
issuing reports containing overly optimistic earnings forecasts and other
projections, called "booster shots," thereby manipulating the issuer's
stock price immediately after an IPO. This entanglement theory has
been described as a "devil's bargain" whereby weak companies are
brought public and the company's stock price is inflated until issuers'
directors can sell out their personal holdings. 10
These cases name analysts as individual defendants and suggest a
complex conspiracy between issuer, analyst, and underwriter to defraud
investors. As noted in one recent complaint:
Defendants accomplished their scheme and common course of conduct
through the issuance of a series of interrelated and interdependent false and
misleading reports to shareholders, filings with the SEC, financial statements
and press releases to the public, as well as approving the issuance of (and
reprinting) false and misleading analysts' reports which misrepresented the true
facts regarding Coastcast's business, new products, manufacturing expertise, and
future business prospects and created a false impression of continuing growth
and future profitability. The Individual Defendants all benefitted from the
illegal course of conduct by selling Coastcast stock owned by them at
artificially inflated prices .... 11

10. Jonathan C. Dickey, The New "Entanglement" Theory: Securities Analysts are
Sued in Class Action Complaints, INSIGHTS, Mar. I 995, at 3.
11. Stark v. Present, No. 94-5712, at 17 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 22, 1994).
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As the above complaint illustrates, the "devil's bargain" suggests an
intricate level of market manipulation over a sustained period of time.
Several of the suits alleging this new form of entanglement have been
voluntarily dismissed. It is unclear, however, how the trial courts will
respond to these class action suits, especially in light of the fact that
analysts apparently issue more favorable earnings forecasts and
recommendations for their firm's underwriting clients than for issuers
with whom they have no preexisting relationship. 12

3.

Cost Benefit Analysis

Issuers should involve analysts in the due diligence phase of an IPO.
While there is a risk of selective disclosure, there are sound business
reasons for involving analysts in the IPO process which counterbalance
these risks and which make an SEC argument of "personal benefit" less
likely. As one author has noted:
[T]he !PO issuer has eminently reasonable corporate business purposes in
permitting an analyst full access to its internal information. These include
permitting the underwriters to conduct more effective due diligence ...
increasing the underwriters' confidence level in the issuer's business plan and
projections, and assuring that the analyst's earnings estimates ... are in tum
based on all available information about the issuer. Indeed, these business
purposes are in full accord with the public policy of the Securities Act, which
is to assure full disclosure to investors in securities distributed in the course of
registered public offerings.
By contrast, the corporate officers working on the IPO derive no personal
benefit from the disclosure to the analyst. Even taking the SEC's broad views
of "personal benefit" into consideration, this may be one of the few examples
of a "completely business-justified disclosure" that should therefore be
"immunized from liability." 13

With respect to liability on the basis of entanglement, as discussed
below, entanglement claims are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain
as the courts have recently required plaintiffs to plead specific facts such
as time, place, and statements made, in order to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
Finally, an issuer can take additional measures to further guard against
selective disclosure or entanglement law suits. For example, an issuer
can designate a handful of corporate officers who can monitor written

12. See H. Lin & M. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships in Analysts' Research
Reports (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). See also Roni
Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter
Analyst Recommendations (Apr. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with San Diego
Law Review).
13. See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 11.
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or oral information supplied to the analyst. An issuer can also adopt a
written policy statement indicating how far they will participate with the
analyst in the due diligence process and that the company will not
review the analyst's projections. If the company does elect to review the
analyst's report, it can provide a disclaimer describing the purpose of the
review. Such a disclaimer may include the following:
Our review of the report has been limited to the accuracy of the factual
information contained therein as of the date of our review. As a matter of
corporate policy, we do not comment on analysts' projections or earnings
estimates and our review of the report should not in any manner be viewed as
agreement or acquiescence on our part with the projections, predictions or
opinions set forth therein.
In addition, we assume no responsibility to provide you with any material
information which may not be included in the report or to update any
information which may become inaccurate following our review. 14

C.

Analyst Participation in Public Offerings of
Already-Public Companies

Analysts in the majority of offerings involving already-public issuers
generally participate in the due diligence process and contribute the same
insights to the process as discussed above. However, analysts generally
do not participate in obtaining projections from the company and the
need for a "Chinese wall" between analysts and investment banking firm
is even greater than in the IPO setting because the analyst is already in
communication with the company's stockholders.
Some commentators have noted that analysts refrain from publishing
detailed reports about a company if a company is making a public
offering. While there are limitations imposed on analysts circulating
reports during an offering, analysts should probably avail themselves of
Rules 138 and 139 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act), 15 defining the circumstances under which a report is not deemed
to be an offer for the sale of securities.

14. James J. Junewicz, Handling Wall Street Analysts, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1995, at 9,
14. One author has suggested that underwriters, in order to minimize their exposure,
should obtain issuer consent where an analyst will participate in all facets of the due
diligence process and then publish a post-offering analysis. See McLaughlin, supra note
9. We are not aware of any underwriting firms which deliver such a letter other than
Goldman Sachs.
15. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.138, 230.139 (1996); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-l/ (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
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Rule 139 provides that with respect to an issuer who proposes to file
or who has filed a registration statement, a publication by a broker or
dealer of an opinion with respect to the registrant will not be deemed to
be an offer to sell securities even though such broker or dealer is a
participant in the distribution of such securities if:
(a) (I) The registrant meets the registrant requirements of Form S-3 ... and
such information, opinion or recommendation is contained in a publication
which is distributed with reasonable regularity in the normal course of business;
or ...
(b)(I) [Fornon-Form S-3 issuers,] [s]uch information, opinion or recommendation is contained in a publication which:
(i) Is distributed with reasonable regularity in the normal course of business
and
(ii) Includes similar information, opinions or recommendations with respect
to a substantial number of companies in the registrant's industry, or subindustry, or contains a comprehensive list of securities currently recommended
by such broker or dealer.
(2) Such information, opinion or recommendation is given no materially
greater space or prominence in such publication than that given to other
securities or registrants; and
(3) an opinion or recommendation as favorable or more favorable as to the
registrant or any class of its securities was published by the broker or dealer in
the last publication of such broker or dealer addressing the registrant or its
securities prior to the commencement of participation in the distribution. 16

D.

What Do the Cases Say?
I.

Selective Disclosure

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella v.
United States 17 and Dirks v. SEC, 18 a duty to disclose or refrain from
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information arises only when
such trading constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. In Dirks, the Court
ruled that "[w]hether disclosure is a breach of duty ... depends in large
part on the purpose of the disclosure. . . . Thus, the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."19 The Court defined personal benefit as a "pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."20
In March 1991, the SEC applied the Dirks "personal benefits" test in
SEC v. Stevens. 21 In Stevens, the SEC charged a corporate executive
16. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (1996).
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
I 9. Id. at 662.
20. Id. at 663.
21. SEC v. Stevens, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739, 1991 WL 296537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
1991); see also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
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of Ultrasystems, Inc., with unlawful tipping when he called a few
analysts who provided research coverage of the company to let them
know of an anticipated earnings decline. The SEC alleged that Stevens
placed these calls "to protect and enhance his reputation" as a corporate
manager, and therefore the calls had "direct, tangible benefit to his status
as a corporate manager."22
After Stevens' calls, two of the analysts called their clients, who then
sold Ultrasystems' stock prior to Ultrasystems' issuance of a press
release announcing its lower-than-expected revenues and earnings. The
SEC alleged that the loss avoided by these clients was "of at least
$126,455." 23 Stevens agreed to pay the $126,455 as well as to be
permanently enjoined from violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 (1933 Act)24 and section lO(b) of the 1934 Act.
Stevens stretches the "reputational benefit" test of Dirks to its limit.
There was no allegation that Stevens received any type of substantial
reputational benefit that "translates into future eamings."25 The danger
of the Commission's rationale in Stevens is that virtually all selective
disclosures are likely to have been made on some element of personal
motivation. 26 Thus, any executive, even one who is driven by a desire
to serve the corporation, may be charged with deriving a "reputational
benefit" when he or she communicates with analysts. Steven's monetary
liability, representing the trading profits of remote tippees, further serves
as a significant in terroram deterrent for executives who deal with
analysts.
2.

Entanglement Cases

Entanglement theory presents two distinct problems for an issuer
involved in dialogue with an analyst. First, an issuer may become
responsible for what is contained in an analyst's report, including the

22. Stevens, I 991 WL 296537, at • I.
23. Id. at *2.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
25. Stevens, 1991 WL 296537, at •1.
26. See Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of S.E.C. Attitudes to
Securities Analysts, Address to the Eighteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute,
University of California, San Diego (Jan. 24, 1991) (transcript available at San Diego
Law Review). Former SEC commissioner Fleischman suggested that every corporate
officer who communicates with analysts could be viewed as seeking to build, preserve,
redeem or maintain his or her reputation with analysts. Id. at 8.
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analyst's own projections, even where the company does not want to
comment on some of the findings included in the analyst's report.
Second, as a result of an analyst's report being attributable to the
company, the company may have a duty to update and correct material
errors or omissions contained in the analyst's report.
In the leading case of Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 27 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an issuer has a
continuing duty to correct analyst reports where the defendant company
instituted a policy ofregularly meeting with analysts and reviewing their
reports. The court held that management did not assume a continuing
duty to correct the analysts' projections because, while company
personnel would correct factual errors in the reports, it had generally not
commented on earnings projections. The court explained that:
[T]he controversy before us is whether Liggett sufficiently entangled itself with
the analysts' forecasts to render those predictions "attributable to it" . . . . We
have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the preparation of
reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material
errors in those projections. This may occur when officials of the company
have, by their activity, made an implied representation that the information they
have reviewed is true or at least in accordance with the company's views. 28

After reviewing the facts, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's finding that Liggett "did not place its imprimatur, expressly or
impliedly, on the analysts' projections." 29 The court warned, however,
that:
[C]orporate pre-release review of the reports of analysts is a risky activity,
fraught with danger. . . . A company which undertakes to correct errors in
reports presented to it for review may find itself forced to choose between
raising no objection to a statement which, because it is contradicted by internal
information, may be misleading and making that information public at a time
when corporate interests would best be served by confidentiality. 30

One difficulty plaintiffs encounter in pleading entanglement is that the
courts increasingly have required specific facts which definitively link
an analyst's statements to insiders of the company. In Raab v. Gen.
Physics Corp.,31 stockholders of General Physics sued the corporation,
claiming it had misled investors through false statements to analysts and
the media. 32 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to plead specific facts supporting their allegations of fraud, and

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
holding that plaintiffs had not pied specific facts from which the
analyst's report could be attributed to the company. 33 The court
concluded that "soft" or "puffing" statements are generally not material
because the market price is not driven by such vague declarations. 34
The court also concluded that the company's statement that profits
should be in line with analysts' current projections did not constitute a
guarantee that earnings would be forthcoming in particular amounts.
The court considered this forecast not to be material. 35
Recent case law, particularly in California, has also been very
favorable, making it difficult for plaintiffs to plead entanglement. In In
re Time Warner Sec. Litig.,36 plaintiffs alleged that statements made by
unidentified Time Warner insiders in discussions with analysts and
newspaper reporters misled the public by suggesting that Time Warner
would reduce certain outstanding debt. 37 The court, in upholding the
district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 9(b), ruled that the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity and noted that
"at a minimum ... the plaintiff [must] identify the speaker of the
allegedly fraudulent statements."38
Following Time Warner, a number of California district courts have
required plaintiffs to plead specific facts to withstand a motion to
dismiss and have articulated which facts plaintiffs must set forth in their
complaint. In Fisher v. Acuson Corp., the court, citing Time Warner,
noted that:
[T]he heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) require plaintiffs who are
claiming that insiders are liable for third party financial analysts' statements to
show adoption by alleging the following: (I) specific reports and the name of
the insider who adopted them; (2) specific interactions between the insider and
the analyst; and (3) dates on which the interactions occurred. 39

33. Id.
34. Id. at 289.
35. Id. at 29 I.
36. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
37. Id. at 262.
38. Id. at 265. Echoing the Dirks court, the Second Circuit noted that "the
function of financial reporters and security analysts is to determine the truth about the
affairs of publicly traded companies." Id.
39. Fisher v. Acuson Corp., No. C93-20477RMW(EAI), 1995 WL 261439, at •7
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1995); see also Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
In re Cypress Semiconductor, 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995). But see In re
RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r
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The heightened pleading requirements of Fisher appear to be the
current trend in entanglement cases, though it is unclear whether the
courts will continue to move in this direction. 40
A Second Circuit opinion recently adopted a similar line of reasoning.
In San Leandro Emerg. Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Phillip
Morris Cos.,41 plaintiffs alleged that the cigarette maker failed to
disclose plans to lower prices on its flagship Marlboro brand. 42
Plaintiffs alleged that failure to disclose this information rendered several
statements made in analyst meetings and press releases misleading,
including statements that the company would deliver consistent income
growth. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint, stating that Philip Morris' announcement that
it expected Marlboro to perform well and that the company was
"optimistic about its earnings" was mere puffery. 43

E.

Conclusion

Analysts should continue to work with issuers in both initial public
offerings and offerings for publicly held companies. Issuers should,
however, adopt policy statements indicating their level of involvement
with analysts and their stance on reviewing analysts' reports. Issuers
should also adopt internal guidelines which clearly articulate who is
responsible for communication with analysts and who will review any
materials supplied to analysts.
II.

T+3

Effective June 7, 1995, Rule 15c6-1 44 establishes that the standard
settlement time for most broker-dealer trades is three business days after
the trade, or "T + 3."45 When Rule 15c6-1 was first proposed,

98,467 (Oct. 3 I, I 994) (ruling that plaintiffs need only allege insiders provided false
information, approved drafts of analysts' reports, and circulated reports to investors).
40. See also In re Seagate Techn. II Sec. Litig., [I 994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,530 (Feb. 8, 1995) (citing Elkind, 635 F.2d 156, to support
ruling that guidance alone does not make a company liable for analyst's forecast); Gross
v. Summa Four, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,999
(Nov. 8, 1995) (ruling that a company's predictive statements which lacked specificity
failed to meet the materiality requirement under Rule !Ob-5).
41. 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 81 I.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240. l 5c6-l (1993).
45. See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-7168, Release No. 34-35705, 59 S.E.C. Docket 550 (May 11, 1995)
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commentators expressed concern that settlement within T + 3 would not
be feasible because of the amount of time it would take to print and
deliver prospectuses. 46 Two proposals to simplify prospectus delivery
were submitted to the commission: The "Four Firms" proposal and the
Securities Industry Association (SIA) approach. 47

A.

The Four Firms Proposal

The Four Firms proposal was based on the view that most of the
prospectus could be printed before pricing to facilitate delivery within
T + 3, if certain modifications were made to existing SEC rules.48 Six
of the key modifications are summarized below.

1.

Re-Ordering of Prospectuses

The SEC's rule revisions allow issuers to present information that
becomes available or is likely to change at the time of pricing to be
included together either in the beginning of the prospectus after the front
cover page in a "pricing-related information" section or wrapped around
the prospectus inside the front and back cover pages. 49 The pricingrelated information section may include use of proceeds, capitalization,
proforma financial information, dilution, selling shareholder information,
and shares eligible for future sale, among others. If the pricing-related
information is included after the front cover page, the prospectus
summary and risk factors sections may appear immediately following the
pricing-related section. Additionally, disclosure regarding availability of
1934 Act information, nature of reports to be given to security holders,
undertakings with respect to information incorporated by reference, and
enforceability of civil liabilities against foreign persons, required on the
prospectus cover page, may be placed elsewhere in the prospectus.

[hereinafter Adopting Release].
46. The SEC noted that prospectus delivery concerns should be alleviated as
electronic delivery becomes more prevalent. Id. § I.
47. Id. The Four Firms include CS First Boston Corporation, Goldman Sachs &
Co., Lehman Brothers, Inc., and Morgan Stanley & Co. Id.
48. Id. § II(A).
49. Id. § l(A)(I ). To ensure that investors continue to easily locate the "risk
factors" section of the prospectus, the SEC also requires that the cover page of the
prospectus identify the page number at which that section appears in the prospectus and
that the risk factors section be labeled as "Risk Factors."
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2.

Changes in Offering, Size, or Price

An issuer is permitted to register securities by specifying only the title
of the class being registered and the proposed maximum offering
price. 50 However, the issuer is still required to specify in the prospectus the amount of securities being offered and, if the issuer is not a
reporting company, a bona fide estimate of the range of the maximum
offering price. The aggregate dollar amount associated with each class
of securities must be disclosed in the registration fee table. If the issuer
registers more shares than required in the offering, the excess securities
may be carried forward to subsequent registrations of the same class of
securities.
Where the size of an offering increases subsequent to pricing, the
issuer is eligible to use an abbreviated registration statement to register
additional securities, provided that the additional shares represent no
more than a twenty percent increase over the shares previously
registered. 51 This abbreviated registration statement includes the facing
page, a statement incorporating by reference the contents of the prior
filing, all required consents and opinions, and the signature page. It may
also include any price-related information with respect to the offering
that was omitted from the earlier registration statement pursuant to Rule
43OA. The abbreviated registration statement must be filed prior to the
time sales are made and confirmation is given, and is effective upon
filing. 52
Where the size or the price of an offering declared effective under
Rule 43OA do not in the aggregate deviate more than twenty percent
from the price set forth in the registration fee table of the effective
filing, a post-effective amendment is not required. Additionally, where
there is a change in offering size or deviation from the price range
beyond the twenty percent threshold, a post-effective amendment is
required only if such change materially changes the previous disclosure.53 The release does, however, indicate that "issuers continue to be
responsible for evaluating the effect of a volume change or price

50.

Id. § II(A)(2)(a).
Id. § II(A)(2)(b).
52. Id. Abbreviated filing is allowed even where pricing occurs after the SEC
offices have closed. Electronic filers may file via Edgar and others may file by fax,
between 5:30 and 10:00 p.m. Eastern time. Payment may be made after banking hours
by instructing a bank to wire no later than the close of the next business day after filing
and providing certain certifications to the SEC with the filing. Id.
53. Id. § Il(A)(2)(c).
51.
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deviation on the accuracy and completeness of disclosure made to
investors. " 54
3.

Manual Signatures and Incorporating by Reference
Opinions and Consents

The SEC now permits duplicate or facsimile signature to be used in
lieu of manual signatures for any registration filed under the 1934
Act. 55 If facsimile or duplicate signatures are used, the registrant must
maintain the manually signed version for five years and provide it to the
SEC upon request.
4.

Rule 430A Pricing Period

Rule 430A previously provided that a registration could be declared
effective without pricing information if the missing information was
contained in a supplemental prospectus filed five days after the effective
date of the registration statement. 56 The SEC extended the pricing
period to fifteen days, principally to reduce the likelihood that a posteffective amendment would have to be filed.
5.

Acceleration Request

The SEC now permits requests for acceleration of effectiveness to be
transmitted either via facsimile or orally. 57 A letter indicating that the
registrant and managing underwriter intend to request oral acceleration
must be submitted to the Commission prior to the oral acceleration
request. 58
6.

T + 4 For Firm Commitment Offerings Priced
After the Close of the Market

Firm commitment offerings priced after 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard
Time, where the securities are sold by an issuer to an underwriter or a

54. See id. at n.32.
55. Id. § II(A)(3).
56. Id. § II(A)(4).
57. Id. § II(A)( 6).
58. The letter should also indicate that the registrant and the managing underwriter
are aware of their obligations under the 1933 Act. Id.
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broker-dealer participating in an offering, are governed by a T + 4
settlement time frame. 59 The T + 4 period also applies to a secondary
offering where the issuer and managing underwriter agree in writing that
such a settlement period will apply. In addition, the Commission has
provided an "override" provision to T + 3 for the sale of all securities
subject to a firm commitment offering upon agreement by the managing
underwriter and the issuer. The Commission has stressed, however,
"that the override provision is not intended to dilute the presumption in
favor of application of the T + 3 settlement cycle in connection with
firm commitment offerings."60 Instead, the override provision is
intended to be used only in those circumstances when T + 3 settlement
is not feasible.

B.

SIA Proposal

As adopted by the Commission, the SIA approach provides for
incremental prospectus delivery. 61 For offerings registered on forms
other than S-3 or F-3, prospectus delivery is accomplished by delivery
of a rzreliminary prospectus, a term sheet, if necessary, and a confirmation. 2 The term sheet provides all information material to investors
that is not disclosed in the preliminary prospectus. The preliminary
prospectus and term sheet, taken together, may not materially differ from
the disclosure included in the effective registration statement. The term
sheet must be filed with the Commission within two business days after
the earlier of the pricing date or first use. 63
For registrants using short-form registration, delivery may be
accomplished by delivery of a preliminary prospectus, an abbreviated
term sheet, and a confirmation. 64 The abbreviated term sheet must
include, unless described in the preliminary prospectus or incorporated
by reference, a description of the securities (as required by Item 202 of
Regulation S-K) and information regarding material changes (as required
by Item 11 of Form S-3). Offering-specific information usually
contained in the final prospectus, such as use of proceeds and plan of

59. Id. § II(A)(7).
60. Id. § III.
61. Id. § 11(8).
62. Id. § II(BXl).
63. Id. One author has noted that while a term sheet may be effective to quickly
update pricing information it may be the less attractive alternative where the form of
prospectus included in the registration statement at the time of effectiveness has been
significantly modified compared to the preliminary prospectus delivered to investors.
Memorandum from Nicholas Grabar, Compliance with Prospectus Delivery Requirements
in a T + 3 Settlement Environment (May 17, 1995) (on file with authors).
64. Adopting Release, supra note 45, § Il(B)(2).
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distribution, may not be physically delivered to investors and, instead,
is required only in the prospectus supplement filed with the Commission.
It is unclear how comfortable underwriters will be in delivering
abbreviated prospectuses or term sheets to investors or in deviating
significantly from the current ordering of information contained in a
prospectus. Our own experience has been that few issuers have availed
themselves of abbreviated prospectus delivery. 65

III.

RISK FACTORS

Risk factors have become a common section in many prospectuses
even for seasoned companies. The risk factors section is helpful in
establishing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. It is also a useful section
to ensure the issuer's disclosure is complete. There is generally some
discussion as to whether the risk factors section should be drafted prior
to the rest of the prospectus or only after all other items in the prospectus have been drafted. We generally try to write the risk factors section
after everything else is complete, to ensure that we have identified the
specific risks associated with a particular issuer. 66
IV.

"BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE

A recurrent theme of cases dealing with forward-looking information
is that the issuer reaffirmed prior projections through general expressions
of optimism or by confirming its goals at a time when the issuer knew
or should have known that identified problems with products or
operations threatened its ability to achieve the earlier projections. These
allegations often are commingled with sundry other counts constituting
a Rule lOb-5 action. Defendants have a difficult burden dismissing
these claims where internal memoranda, statements to third parties, or
other "smoking guns" contradict the issuer's public statements. Issuers
should beware that virtually any public expression of optimism could be
construed as a reaffirmation of prior forward-looking statements.

65. Financial printers whom we contacted have indicated that they have not had
any problems meeting a T + 3 deadline. Additionally, they have indicated that issuers
and underwriters alike have not wanted to be "first on the block" to deliver tenn sheets
or abbreviated prospectuses.
66. For an account of recent changes brought about by the Private Securities
Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, see infra Part V.B.
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Certain other cases suggest that issuers may avoid liability for
projections and other predictive information when such information is
accompanied by certain risk disclosure. This bespeaks caution doctrine
holds that when precise cautionary language that directly addresses itself
to future projections, estimates, or forecasts is used, such projections,
estimates, or forecasts cannot be misleading as a matter of law. 67 This
doctrine does not apply, however, when the speaker knows he is making
untrue statements. 68 Regardless of the "matter of law" rhetoric used
when speaking of this doctrine, as illustrated by the cases below, and in
light of certain statements made by the Supreme Court in Virginia
Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg,69 the application of the bespeaks caution
doctrine is, indeed, a case-by-case factual analysis.
The following cases demonstrate that, regardless of any safe harbor or
disclosure of risk factors and underlying factual assumptions, forwardlooking statements will be subject to a plaintiff's 20/20 hindsight and
may be actionable under the federal securities laws. On the brighter
side, the Ninth Circuit's recent adoption of the bespeaks caution doctrine
in In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig. 70 shows that issuers may indeed
find protection when cautionary language is specific and not generic-but, as recently emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in Fecht v. Price
Co., 71 the cautionary language must be specific.

67. The rationale for some courts in applying this doctrine is that where there is
enough cautionary language attached to optimistic statements, investors have no right to
rely on only the optimistic statements. For a more detailed discussion of the bespeaks
caution doctrine, see Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution, " 49
Bus. LAW. 481 (1994). It has been argued, however, that "even caution-laden disclosures
may have the propensity to mislead" because "the presence of cautionary language
actually may make the projections more influential." Id. at 497-98. Thus, it can be
argued that courts which assume that cautionary language automatically negates
optimistic statements would be erroneously applying the doctrine. Id. at 497. The other
rationale expressed by the courts is that the cautionary language so dilutes the disclosure
that no reasonable person would find an optimistic message. Id. at 487. See also infra
Part 111.3, for a discussion of Rubinstein v. Collins.
68. But see In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 553
(D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178
(1994)("The 'bespeaks caution' analysis subsumes the misrepresentation analysis. No
reasonable inference can be drawn in favor of a plaintiff that a ... statement which
bespeaks caution as to future forecasts contains actionable misrepresentations." 793 F.
Supp. at 553). See also Langevoort, supra note 67, at 488.
69. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court held that
statements by management of reasons, opinions, or beliefs, even though conclusory in
form, may be material facts that could give rise to misstatement liability under the
federal securities laws. Id. at I 083-84.
70. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. 70 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995).
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In the recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (Reform Act), 72 Congress provided for a statutory safe harbor for
many forward-looking statements based in part upon the bespeaks
caution doctrine, which is discussed in Part V.B of this Article. Some
examples of risk factors language used in recent public filings can be
found in Appendix A. Examples of cautionary language used in press
releases pursuant to the safe harbor provision of the Reform Act can be
found in Appendix B.
1.

In re Donald Trump Casino Securities Litigation

In In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 13 investors who purchased
bonds to provide financing for the Taj Mahal alleged that the prospectus
which accompanied the bond offering contained materially misleading
statements and omissions regarding, among other matters, defendant's
belief that operation of the Taj Mahal would generate enough money to
cover its debt service. The language from the Management Discussion
and Analysis section stated: "The Partnership believes that funds
generated from the operation of the Taj Mahal will be sufficient to cover
all of its debt service (interest and principal)." 74 However, the above
statement was followed by a warning: "No assurance can be given,
however, that the actual operating results will meet the Partnership's
expectations. See 'Special Considerations-Ability of the Partnership to
Service Debt. "'75 The referenced subsection listed several specific risk
factors and scenarios under .which the contemplated adverse effects
would materialize. 76
The district court dismissed the action, applying the bespeaks caution
doctrine and stating that the prospectus "virtually bristle[d] with
warnings" concerning the "extremely risky nature of the investment."77
The Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the lower court's ruling,
concluding that, in light of the disclaimers contained in the prospectus,

72. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (West Supp. 1995) (codified in scattered
sections of 15. U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act].
73. 793 F. Supp. 543, 554 (D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1178 ( 1994).
74. 793 F. Supp. at 555.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 554.
77. Id. at 555.
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"no reasonable investor could believe anything but that the Taj Mahal
bonds represented a rather risky, speculative investment."78 The court
stated that:
(W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will
not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect
the "total mix" of information the document provided investors. In other words,
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law. 79

On March 7, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the federal
appeals court's decision to stand.

2.

Sinay and Mayer

In Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 80 the Sixth Circuit held that the
issuer's optimistic statements regarding its performance and confirmation
of an analyst's earnings estimates were not misleading where the
predictions bespoke sufficient caution. The issuer also could not predict
a decline in the construction market nor a devastating labor strike any
better than the public.
But in Mayer v. Mylod, 81 the Sixth Circuit appears to have backed
down from the bespeaks caution doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's
statements in Virginia Bankshares that, while publishing accurate facts
can render misleading statements too unimportant as to create liability,
not every mixture of the true will neutralize the deceptive. In Mayer,
the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court's application of Sinay to
several statements of "opinion" made by a Michigan bank, holding that
Virginia Bankshares requires a weighing of the true with the untrue and
thus cautionary statements cannot "as a matter of law" render optimistic
statements unactionable. 82
3.

Rubinstein v. Collins

In Rubinstein v. Collins, 83 the Fifth Circuit stated that "cautionary
language is not necessarily sufficient, in and of itself, to render
predictive statements immaterial as a matter of law."84 Thus, while

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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7 F.3d at 369.
Id. at 371.
948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991).
988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 637.
20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 167.

[VOL. 33: 1027, 1996]

Developments in Disclosure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

"[i]nclusion of cautionary language-along with disclosure of any firmspecific adverse facts or assumptions--is, of course, relevant to the
materiality inquiry . . . cautionary language as such is not per se
dispositive of this inquiry." 85
In Rubinstein, Plains Resources, Inc. (Plains), one of the defendants
to the suit, announced on August 19, 1991, that it had made a significant
natural gas discovery which was characterized as "substantial. " 86
Initial tests of the discovery were conducted, and analysts subsequently
gave optimistic opinions about high yields from the discovery. On
October 23, 1991, Defendant-Appellee Armstrong, Chief Financial
Officer of Plains, was reported to have characterized as "realistic" an
analyst's opinion that, among other things, the asset value of Plains was
between $66 to $100 per share. 87 In November 1991, Plains filed a
registration statement for a proposed secondary public offering which
reiterated the initial test results, as well as asserting:
Although there is insufficient production history and other data available to
definitively quantify the proved reserves attributable to this discovery, the
Company believes . . . that the ... well is a significant discovery that, when
fully evaluated, could add substantially to the Company's oil and natural gas
reserves. There can be no assurance, however, that subsequent production,
drilling and other data will not cause the Company to reevaluate its assessment
of the significance of this discovery. 88

Similar statements were made in the prospectus that accompanied the
offering.
Plaintiff alleged that this registration statement, as well as the October
23rd statements, was misleading because the defendants knew that the
discovery testing done up to that time "was not sufficient to provide a
reasonable basis for these statements, and failed to disclose the declines
in flow-tube and shut-in pressures."89 On December 4, 1991, the
defendants beW<an to disclose some of the adverse information regarding
the discovery. Five days later, however, Plains' CEO announced that
the discovery was up and running and was producing gas and condensate

°

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

168 (footnotes omitted).
162-63.
163.
163-64.
164.
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at levels seen before the recent sharp drop in flow-tube pressure. 91 On
January 24, 1992, the planned public offering took place. Then, on
March 30, 1992, Plains filed its 10-K report in which it reiterated the
October test results for the discovery. 92 Finally, on April 13, 1992, an
analyst publicly reported. that the discovery well had reserves with a
value of less than $2 million, which would not even cover the actual
cost of the well. 93
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated section IO(b) and
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule !Ob-5 thereunder, as well as
violating certain state laws. The district court dismissed these claims
because the statements by defendants "were made in good faith,
suggested reliability and bespoke caution."94 According to the district
court, "positive economic forecasts and predictions such as those made
by defendants may not form the basis of a securities fraud action when
such statements are couched in cautionary language."95
The Fifth Circuit subsequently overturned the district court's decision
to grant the motion to dismiss, stating that the district court had applied
the bespeaks caution doctrine too broadly. 96 In its decision, the Fifth
Circuit declined to follow Sinay and instead cited Mayer favorably. 97
Thus, it appears that some courts will continue to back down from the
bespeaks caution doctrine, as Mayer and Rubinstein reveal, and instead
find that statements couched in cautionary language are merely part of
the "total mix of information" that courts look to in determining liability.
Conversely, the bespeaks caution doctrine has gained support in other
courts, as In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,98 discussed below,
illustrates.
4.

In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation

In Worlds of Wonder, the Ninth Circuit adopted the bespeaks caution
doctrine and affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
the defendants regarding the textual part of the Debenture Prospectus. 99
Worlds of Wonder (WOW) was formed in 1985 and quickly achieved
huge success with its two lines of toys: Teddy Ruxpin and Lazer Tag.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at n.21.

35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1423-24.
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Hoping to fund further expansion, WOW conducted a debenture offering
in June of 1987, raising $80 million. 100 This additional infusion of
capital was inadequate to sustain WOW's uncontrolled growth and, in
addition to sluggish sales in the 1987 Christmas season, led to WOW
filing for bankruptcy on December 21, 1987 .101 Several purchasers of
WOW debentures subsequently filed this class action, alleging that the
prospectus accompanying the offering was false and misleading in
violations of sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section lO(b) of
the 1934 Act. 102
The district court below had found that where a prospectus contains
extensive discussions of the specific risks inherent in investing in a startup toy company, optimistic statements about such investment are not
misleading as a matter of law. 103 The district court stated that "it does
not matter if the optimistic statements are later found to have been
inaccurate or based on erroneous assumptions when made, provided that
the risk disclosure was conspicuous, specific, and adequately disclosed
the assumptions upon which the optimistic language was based." 104
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue whether the district
court erred by adopting and applying the bespeaks caution doctrine. The
Ninth Circuit began its discussion of the doctrine by noting that at least
six circuits have adopted some form of the bespeaks caution doctrine. 105 The court further stated that "the doctrine, when properly
construed, merely represents the pragmatic application of two fundamental concepts in the law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance." 106
The Ninth Circuit then found that the district court had applied the
doctrine narrowly and thus affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of defendants. The court stated:
To prevent [an overbroad application of the doctrine], the bespeaks caution
doctrine applies only to precise cautionary language which directly addresses
itself to future projections, estimates or forecasts in a prospectus. By contrast,
blanket warnings that securities involve a high depee of risk (are] insufficient
to ward against a federal securities fraud claim. 10

100.
101.
102.
103.
I04.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1411.
Id. at 1412.
Id.
814 F. Supp. 850, 858-59 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 858.
35 F.3d at 1413.
Id. at 1414.
Id. at 1414.
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5.

Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc.

In Harden v. Rajfensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 108 plaintiffs alleged
that Raffensperger, as underwriter, was liable for among other things,
misstatements concerning the issuer's ability to secure insurance and its
plans to restore company profitability. 109 Raffensperger argued that
sufficient cautionary language was used in connection with the alleged
misstatements so that it could rely on a bespeaks caution defense. " 0
In rejecting Raffensperger's arguments, the court noted:
Essentially, Raffensperger contends that the word "plans" used in this statement
means "future efforts" rather than existing methods, ideas, or means of
achieving some goal. We cannot agree. . . . Contrary to Raffensperger's
attempt to portray the "plans to restore [profitability] statement" as containing
solelv "soft information," the statement constitutes a present assertion of fact
,11

And again, with respect to the issuer's cautionary statement regarding
its efforts to secure insurance the court found:
[The company] knew, prior to the issuance of the registration statement, that
there was in fact no possibility of such approval and omitted to disclose this
fact. The information ... does not concern subjective or "soft information,"
but rather "hard facts." The bespeaks caution doctrine does not, as a matter of
law, offset the materiality of such information. 112

The court's distinction between "hard" and "soft" information has lead
some commentators to suggest that the decision cuts back on the
bespeaks caution defense. However, the court's emphasis on the
language used by defendant in preparing the registration statement
suggests that more concise drafting by issuer and underwriter may
preserve a bespeaks caution argument even if the cautionary language
concerns hard facts.

6.

Fecht v. Price Company

In late 1995, the Ninth Circuit signaled that it will carefully review
dismissals of securities fraud claims based upon the bespeaks caution
doctrine in Fecht v. Price Co. 113 The court quoted its ruling in In re
Worlds of Wonder, but went on to state:

108.
I 09.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995).
at I 395.
at 1405.
at 1406 (footnote omitted).
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The "bespeaks caution" doctrine is thus wholly consistent with our analysis that
whether a statement in a public document is misleading may be determined as
a matter of law only when reasonable minds could not disagree as to whether
the mix of information in the document is misleading. Inclusion of some
cautionary language is not enough to support a determination as a matter of law
that defendants' statements were not misleading. 114

In early 1996, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it considered Pecht to
be the controlling case for reviewing dismissals based on the bespeaks
caution doctrine. In Warshaw v. Xoma, 115 the court applied the Pecht
standard to a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that
effective cautionary language must be so obvious that reasonable minds
could not differ as to its meaning. 116 The court concluded: "The
Complaint asserts that the defendants knew that the facts contravened
their 'optimistic' statements that ES was safe, effective, and would be
approved by the FDA. In this case, we easily conclude that the
Complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) requirements." 117

7.

Pozzi v. Smith

In Pozzi v. Smith, 118 an electronics and software company, Quad
Systems Corp., could not invoke the bespeaks caution doctrine because
the company's use of cautionary language was qualified. 119 Quad
disclosed certain problems it was having with its software, but qualified
the disclosures by saying that the problems were not unusual and could
be satisfactorily resolved. 120 The court concluded: "Thus, even
though Quad made certain cautionary statements about software
limitations and bugs (which it soft-pedaled by describing them as not
unusual), it was simultaneously hiding the effect of those problems on
the Company's business ...." 121

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
(Dec. I,
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1082.
74 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).

Id. at 959-60.
Id. at 960.
Pozzi v. Smith, (1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 98,967
I 995).

Id. at 93,666.
Id.
Id. at 93,669.
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V.

USE OF FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENT INFORMATION

Except in self-dealing transactions, such as going private transactions,
projections are overwhelmingly not used in public offering documents.
This is primarily attributed to the wave of securities fraud class action
suits challenging even the slightest misstatement regarding predictive
expression. 122
The SEC has made an effort to promote more forward-looking
information through its emphasis on MD&A in its Concept Release, m
issued last year, designed to implement reform to the 1979 safe harbor
rules. The Concept Release included eight alternative proposals to the
safe harbor rules and solicited comment on over seventy questions.
Despite the large number of alternative proposals and widespread support
for expanding the safe harbor rules, during 1995 it became clear that the
SEC would not create a new safe harbor rule as recent legislative
activity replaced the SEC initiative.

A.

Recent Decisions

The courts have also recently issued rulings which help minimize
exposure resulting from the use of forward-looking statements. For
example, in Herman v. Legent Corp., 124 Thomas Herman, representative for a class of investors in Legent Corporation, brought a "fraud on
the market" securities fraud class action, alleging that Legent made a
series of fraudulent public statements about its future performance that
inflated the value of Legent's stock over a six-month period. 125 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the statements of future performance
were not fraudulent. 126
The opinion seems, on its face, to restrict the scope of securities fraud
in actions pertaining to public predictions of future performance. The
court proclaims that statements regarding projections of future performance are actionable under Section lO(b) and Rule l0b-5 only if they
are supported by specific statements of fact or are worded as guaran-

122. See Christie Harlan, SEC Seeks To Beef Up "Safe Harbor" Provision, WALL
ST. J., May 17, 1994, at Bl (noting that of 218 companies responding to a Journal
survey, more than one-half indicated that the prospect of shareholder litigation affected
the dissemination of forward-looking information).
123. Concept Release and Notice of Hearing: Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking
Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7101, 59 Fed. Reg. 52723 (Oct. 1994).
124. 1995 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 98,650 (I 995).
125. Id. at 92,003.
126. Id. at 92,0 I 0.
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tees. 127 The "specific statements of fact" would have to be extremely
specific to qualify, such as statements referring to specific business
projects. 128 Otherwise, such "soft" or "puffing" statements involving
optimistic opinions or predictions of future performance are not material,
and thus not actionable as a matter of law. Companies are to be given
freedom to prognosticate.
Other courts have relied on the bespeaks caution doctrine to dismiss
claims based on faulty projections. In Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin
Assoc., Ltd., 129 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
grant of summary judgment to defendants under the bespeaks caution
doctrine. The Court noted that "when an offering document's projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements and specific
warnings of the risks involved, that language may be sufficient to render
the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of
law."130
Many other decisions during 1995 were unsympathetic to suits
claiming the use of false or misleading forward-looking information.
Various reasons were used to support dismissals of such claims: The
statements were too vague to be material, 131 the statements merely
expressed general enthusiasm, 132 and the forward-looking statements
had a reasonable basis. 133 As is always the situation, however, some
courts have upheld complaints based on allegations similar to the ones
other courts have dismissed. 134

B.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

December 1995 was a month of high drama for securities professionals. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
127. Id. at 92,005.
128. Id.
129. 45 F.3d 399 (I Ith Cir. 1995).
I 30. Id. at 400.
131. Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1995).
132. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
133. In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., [I 995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep (CCH) '1198,762 (Dec. 29, 1995). See also Jonathan Eisenberg, Securities
Litigation: Courts Are Increasingly Willing to Dismiss Weak Claims, INSIGHTS, Sept.
1995, at 11.
134. E.g., In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 98,793 (May 8, 1995); In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp.
1410 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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1995 (Reform Act) 135 and sent it to the White House. Most observers
thought that President Clinton would sign the legislation, but at the last
minute he vetoed it. 136 Both Houses quickly overrode the veto and the
Reform Act became law before the end of the year. 137 According to
the Conference Report (Report), Congress sought to limit abusive,
manipulative, and frivolous securities litigation and "to protect investors,
issuers and all those who are associated with our capital markets." 138
The Reform Act operates on a number of levels:
•
Class action procedures, including the mechanics of
settlement, have been significantly tightened.
•
A system of proportional liability has in many instances
replaced joint and several liability.
•
Pleading standards have been raised, especially regarding
"state of mind allegations."
•
In certain circumstances, discovery has been limited.
•
Auditors are required to report illegal acts.
•
The SEC-but not private parties-is expressly authorized
to prosecute for aiding and abetting violations.
•
More specific direction is provided regarding the calculation of damages and the necessity to prove loss causation.
•
Except for when there has been a criminal conviction,
"any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in
the purchase or sale of securities" cannot be the predicate
for a violation of RICO. rn
•
A safe-harbor has been added to both the 1933 and 1934
Acts for a "forward looking statement."
The focus of this section will be on the new safe harbor provisions,
although the other provisions of the Reform Act are extremely important
and will change the landscape of securities litigation. It is too early to
tell, but we "forecast":
•
It will take considerable litigation and many years to flush
out the meaning of the new legislation.

135. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (West Supp. 1995) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Reform Act].
136. Presidential Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
(1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,i 85,714, at 87,234-35 (Dec. 20,
1995).
137. The Reform Act does not affect or apply to any private securities action
commenced and pending before the Act was adopted.
138. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
139. Reform Act, supra note 135, Tit. I, § I 07.
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•

It will most likely reduce frivolous litigation, but "serious"
suits will be more costly to defend and more expensive to
settle.
•
Proportionate liability may turn out to be a double-edged
sword.
•
While the contours of the safe harbor provisions are not
fully formed, they will in all probability reduce the
number of suits filed based upon the use of forward
looking information and be of considerable value to
defendants defending against such claims.
The safe harbor provisions are rather simple. They apply to both
written and oral statements made by or on behalf of a reporting
issuer. 140 To fall within the safe harbor provisions, a forward-looking
statement must satisfy the following:
( 1) IN GENERAL.-

(A)

The forward-looking statement is--identified as a forward-looking statement, and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
The plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking
statement(i)
if made by a natural person, was made with actual
knowledge by that person that the statement was false or
misleading; or
(ii)
if made by a business entity; was--(I)
made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity, and
(i)

(B)

140. Id. § 102. The safe-harbor provisions apply to statements made by an issuer,
a person acting on behalf of an issuer, an outside reviewer retained by the issuer or an
underwriter. Id. § I 02(a). The term "person acting on behalf of an issuer" is further
defined to mean an officer, director or employee of the issuer. Id.
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(II)
made or approved by such officer with
actual knowledge by that officer that the statement
was false or misleading.
(2) ORAL FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS.(A)

(B)

If the oral forward-looking statement is accompanied by

a cautionary statement(i)
that the particular oral statement is a forwardlooking statement; and
(ii)
that the actual results could differ materially from
those projected in the forward-looking statement;
and
ifthe oral forward-looking statement is accompanied
(i)
by an oral statement that additional information
. . . is contained in a readily available written
document, or portion thereof; 141
the accompanying oral statement . . . identifies
(ii)
[where to locate the additional information]; and
(iii) the [additional] information contained in that
written document is a cautionary statement that
satisfies the standard established in paragraph
(l )(A).142

Forward-looking information is broadly defined to include: 143
•
Projections of revenues, income, earnings per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other
financial iterns.
•
Plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including future products or services.
•
Future economic performance, including any statement
contained in MD&A. The assumptions underlying any of
the foregoing.
•
A report issued by an outside reviewer to the extent that
it assesses a forward- looking statement made by the
issuer.

14 I. "Readily available information" means any "document filed with the
Commission or generally disseminated." See H.R. CoNF. REP., supra note 138, at 45.
142. Reform Act, supra note 135, Title I, § 102(a)(c)(l)-(2).
143. Id. § 102(a)(i)(l)(A)-(F).
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•

Statements containing projections that may be covered by
specific rules of the SEC.
Very importantly, the Reform Act specifically provides that the safe
harbor provisions do not impose a duty to update forward-looking
statements. 144 The SEC, moreover, is expressly granted authority to
craft additional safe harbors. 145
There a number of specific and important exclusions from the safe
harbor: 146
•
Forward-looking statements by certain issuers are excluded:
Those with a "bad boy" history.
Forward-looking statements made by a blank check
company in connection with an offering of its
securities.
Penny stock issuers.
An issuer who makes a forward-looking statement
in connection with a roll-up transaction.
An issuer who makes a forward-looking statement
in connection with a going private transaction.
•
Forward-looking statements made in certain SEC forms or
in certain transactions are excluded: 147
Statements made in certified financial statements.
Statements made by investment companies.
Statements made in connection with a tender offer.
Statements made in connection with an IPO.
Statements made in connection with an offering by,
or relating to the operation of, partnerships, limited
liability companies, or direct participation investment programs.
Statements made concerning beneficial ownership
in Schedules 13D.
The Report emphasizes that part of the foundation for adopting the
safe harbor is to encourage companies to disclose forward-looking

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 102(a)(d).
§ 102(a)(g).
§ 102(a)(b)(l)(A)-(E).
§ 102(a)(b)(2)(A)-(F).
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information. It also furnishes some helpful legislative history that will
be useful in interpreting and applying the new safe harbor provisions:
•
Boilerplate warnings do not qualify as "meaningful
cautionary statements"----the cautionary statements must
convey substantive information that realistically could
cause results to differ from those projected. 148
•
"Important factors" need to be identified, but not "all
factors" nor "the particular factor that ultimately causes
the forward-looking statement not to come true." 149
•
The courts, "where appropriate," are invited to decide
motions to dismiss "without examining the state of mind
of the defendant." 150
•
A second prong of the safe harbor does focus on the state
of the mind of the person making the forward-looking
statement: Such person will not be liable in a private
action "unless a plaintiff proves that person or business
entity made a false or misleading forward-looking statement with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading. "1s1
•
The Conference Committee has established the safe harbor
as a "starting point" and "fully expects" the SEC to
continue rulemaking procedures in this area.
Client education concerning the Reform Act is essential. Emphasis
should be on the development of"meaningful cautionary statements" and
the adoption of procedures to implement the oral safe harbor, including
the magic language in the oral statement and identifying and publishing
the "readily available written document."
C.

Duty to Update

The cases discussed below, including the well-publicized case
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 152 suggest that issuers have a duty to
update statements which were accurate when made, but which become
inaccurate due to subsequent developments. These cases confuse the
148. H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 138, at 43. The cases applying the bespeaks
caution doctrine will clearly be useful in interpreting the term "meaningful cautionary
statements." Indeed, the Report states that the Conference Committee does not intend
that the safe harbor provisions replace the bespeaks caution doctrine or to stop further
development of that doctrine by the courts. Id. at 46.
149. Id. at 43-44.
150. Id. at 44.
151. Id. at 44.
152. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 94,899 (Jan. 23,
1990), withdrawn, 910 F.2d IO ( I st Cir. I 990) (en bane).

1058

Developments in Disclosure

[VOL. 33: 1027, I 996]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

duty to correct and the duty not to mislead. If an issuer makes a
statement that is not accurate or is misleading based on the facts and
circumstances existing at the time of such statement, then the issuer has
a duty to correct such misstatements. That is not to say that an issuer
has a duty to update statements which are accurate when made, but later
become inaccurate or misleading due to a change of facts and circumstances. There is virtually no precedent for the proposition that either
the duty to correct or the duty not to mislead requires that issuers update
prior statements which were accurate when made. Unfortunately, these
decisions would impose upon issuers an obligation to continually
disclose all material information during the period between SEC reports.
In fact, these cases are misconstrued duty not to mislead claims. The
duty to update theory is a misnomer which threatens to negate the
established principle that an independent trigger of a duty to disclose is
a distinct element of a Rule lOb-5 action. Although a narrower duty to
update only so-called forward-looking statements appears more palatable,
in practice it would be an unworkable and dangerous precedent. Such
a duty to update prior disclosures would discourage issuers from making
disclosure in the first place, and, therefore, is counterproductive to a
system which encourages timely voluntary disclosure of material
information. 153 Nevertheless, issuers should be aware that there is a
clear trend to re~uire such a duty, as the recent case, In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig., 1 4 illustrates.
J.

Backman v. Polaroid Corporation

If bad facts make bad law, then the opinion by a panel of the First
Circuit in Backman v. Polaroid Corporation 155 shows that unique
circumstances also can produce bad law. The panel's opinion, recently
withdrawn and vacated, would have imposed upon Polaroid a broad duty
to disclose material adverse developments concerning its new instant

153. See, e.g., Carl W. Schneider, Update on the Duty to Update: Did Polaroid
Produce the Instant Movie After All?, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 83 (1990); Carl W.
Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-Polaroid II Brings a Welcome Limitation,
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1990, at 2; Carl W. Schneider, The Duty to Update: Time Requires a
Reevaluation of Basics, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1994, at 2.
154. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
155. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I( 94,899 (Jan. 23,
1990), withdrawn, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane).
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movie system called "Polavision" solely to update prior statements
which, although accurate when made, were rendered inaccurate by
subsequent adverse developments. The panel would have imposed this
interim period disclosure obligation even though it was unable to
conclude that Polaroid was either trading in its own securities or making
statements which, without an update, would have been otherwise
misleading.
Fortunately, the court's opinion was withdrawn and the judgment
vacated. After a rehearing en bane, the First Circuit held that Polaroid's
statements could not have been considered misleading when made, nor
did they ever become misleading in light of subsequent events. 156
Nevertheless, because the full court did not completely reject the notion
that certain forward-looking statements could require further disclosure,
the Polaroid case merits close attention to prevent the so-called duty to
update from receiving further credibility.
a.

Unique Circumstances: The Third Quarter Report,
Polavision Problems, and the Foundation Stock Sale

Polaroid introduced its much-heralded Polavision with a massive ad
campaign in the Spring of 1978, projecting sales of200,000 units for the
year. 157 By October, the company had adjusted projected sales to
100,000 units and ordered a decrease in production at its supplier. 158
Polaroid temporarily ceased all production of Polavision in November
to deplete excess inventory. On both occasions, Polaroid requested
secrecy from its supplier concerning the cutbacks. In early December,
1978 Polaroid circulated among upper management a forecast estimating
1978 sales of Polavision at 97,000 units. 159
Polaroid's Third Quarter Report to Stockholders, issued on November
5, 1978, emphasized increased earnings, boominfl sales and record
manufacturing output for the company as a whole. 60 These representations were true and correct in every respect. The report made only the
following direct reference to Polavision: "[The President] noted also that
earnings continue to reflect substantial expenses associated with
Polavision, Polaroid's new system of instant movies." 161 The report
also attributed a major part of the company's increase in the ratio of cost
of sales to net sales for the first nine months of the year and the third
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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910 F.2d at 16-18.
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 94,899 at 94,938.
Id. at 94,939.
Id.
Id. at 94,938.
Id. at 94,956 (alteration in original).
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quarter, to "substantial expenses associated with Polavision." 162 These
statements also were true.
On January 9, 1979, the Rowland Foundation, a charitable organization run by Dr. Edwin Land, Polaroid's founder, Chairman, and CEO,
issued a press release through Polaroid's public relations department
announcing its intent to sell 300,000 Polaroid shares. 163 The press
release had been reviewed by Polaroid's in-house counsel and the
Foundation's attorney, a vice-president and director of Polaroid. The
press release cited the Foundation's desire to diversify as its reasons for
the sale and mentioned Dr. Land's impending retirement as Chairman
and CEO of Polaroid. The release made no reference to Polavision.
The stock was sold on January 11, 1979 for $52 per share.
On January 15, 1979, Polaroid circulated to management an internal
report estimating fourth quarter earnings slightly lower than anticipated,
and recommending a reserve for additional Polavision expenditures. 164
Polaroid booked a reserve of $6.8 million for Polavision losses on
February 1. At the close of the market on February 22, 1979, Polaroid
issued a press release announcing a twenty-six percent increase in
earnings for fiscal year 1978 and earnings per share of $1.32 for the
fourth quarter. The release further disclosed that Polavision had incurred
manufacturing and marketing expenses "substantially in excess of
revenues" and that the project would continue to make such demands on
cash and earnings in 1979. 165 Polaroid's stock fell from almost $50
on February 22 to $43 on February 23, stabilizing at about $40 by
March 1.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Polaroid misled investors by intentionally
de-emphasizing the Polavision difficulties when it announced record
earnings for the third quarter. 166 The plaintiffs alleged that Polaroid
had a duty to disclose the subsequent Polavision production cuts and the
December and January internal reports to prevent the Third Quarter
Report from "becoming misleading." 167 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted
that the press release announcing the Foundation stock sale was

162.
163.

164.
165.
I 66.
167.

Id.
Id. at 94,939.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94,939-40.
Id. at 94,940.
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misleading because it did not discuss the adverse developments in the
Polavision project.
After a bifurcated trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and
awarded an aggregate of $9.75 per share in damages to all the class
participants. 168 Polaroid appealed the verdict, arguing that it never
uttered any misleading statements or engaged in any conduct that would
trigger a duty to disclose. Polaroid also challenged the jury instructions
regarding materiality and the duty to disclose.

b.

Duty to Disclose-No Misstatements

The First Circuit panel in Polaroid held that the trial judge's
instructions to the jury regarding Rule l0b-5 improperly equated the
duty to disclose with materiality and failed to specify the events that
would trigger a duty to disclose. 169 Writing for the panel, Judge
Bownes properly stated the circumstances that would trigger an
obligation to disclose material information: "1) when a 'corporate insider
trades on confidential information,' 2) when a corporation has made
'inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior disclosures,' and 3) when a
statute or regulation requires disclosure." 170
The panel also determined that the Third Quarter Report was accurate
and not misleading at the time of its issuance. 171 Due to its significant
involvement in the Rowland Foundation press release, the panel found
that Polaroid was responsible for its content. Judge Bownes expressed
significant reservations, however, that the release, standing alone, would
provide an adequate basis to impose liability on Polaroid for the alleged
omissions.

c.

Bad Law: The Duty to Update

Notwithstanding that the Third Quarter Report was accurate and not
misleading when made, the panel held that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the report "became misleading" once Polaroid ordered the
November production halts and had assembled earnings estimates
showing poor fourth quarter performance. The panel asserted that even
though the statements were accurate when made, "a duty to disclose can

168. Id.
169. Id. at 94,939-40. The panel also found that the trial judge failed to specifically
instruct the jury with respect to the good faith defense to scienter. Id. The Rule I 0b-5
scienter requirement is beyond the scope of this article.
170. Id. at 94,942 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26-27 (1st
Cir. I 987)).
171. Id. at 94,950.
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arise if a company possesses material facts that must be released in order
to render prior statements not misleading." 172 Therefore, rather than
overturn the jury verdict, the First Circuit panel ordered a new trial.
d.

Dubious Relief' The En Banc Opinion

In the opinion en bane, the First Circuit reasserted that a duty to
disclose would arise only if the issuer is either trading in its own
securities, has made prior inaccurate statements, or is required by a
specific statute or regulation. 173 The full court also concluded that
Polaroid's statements in the Third Quarter Report about Polavision's
negative effect on earnings were complete and accurate when made, and
remained true and correct at all times thereafter. 174 The court ruled
that Polaroid had satisfied its obligations by disclosing that Polavision
was being sold below cost. 175 The court rejected the claim that
Polaroid misled investors by electing not to say how much below
cost. 176 The court stated that the duty not to mislead "does not mean
that by revealing one fact about a product, one must reveal all others
that, too, would be interesting, market-wise, but means only such others,
if any, that are needed so that what was revealed would not be 'so
incomplete as to mislead. "' 177
Finding no evidence in the record to suggest that Polaroid knew by
November that Polavision was a commercial failure, the court refused to
consider the Polavision statements misleading simply because the Third
Quarter Report omitted to mention exact sales figures.
The court also confirmed that if the Polavision statements had been
misleading when made, Polaroid would have had a duty to correct
them. 178 Because the Polavision statements remained true and correct
at all times after their utterance, no duty to correct ever arose. As for
the so-called duty to update, the full court stated that "in special circumstances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
I 968)).
178.

Id. at 94,944.
Polaroid, 910 F.2d at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir.
Id. at 16-17.
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connotation upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a
clear meaning, and there is a change, correction, more exactly, further
disclosure, may be called for." 179
The court acknowledged that it need not face that question, however,
because even if the Polavision statements were forward-looking, they
remained precisely correct after their release. 180 Hence, the court's
statements as to the duty to update are dicta. 181

e.

A Bad Precedent

Although the First Circuit's rejection of a broad duty to update is a
welcome relief, the dicta language suggesting that certain forwardlooking statements require further disclosure is very troubling. To
distinguish statements of present fact from purely speculative and
forward- looking disclosure is practically impossible. Issuers also have
no reasonable guidance as to the duration of viability of such statements
in the market. Because of the compliance difficulties it presents,
acceptance of even a limited duty to update would eviscerate the
traditional rule that issuers have no general duty to disclose.
Various commentators and the SEC have long recognized the peculiar
problems raised by forward-looking statements, speculative analysis, and
projections. 182 The SEC has historically accepted a modicum of
"touting" as an acceptable business practice and has adopted Rule 175

179. Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 17-18.
181. Ironically, Judge Bownes' dissent to the opinion en bane provides a better
discussion of the disclosure issue than that given in the majority opinion. See id. at 18
(Bownes, J., dissenting). Judge Bownes admits that the language in the panel opinion
could be construed as creating an overly broad "duty to update" past accurate statements
of historical fact and that no such "duty to update" should exist. Id. at 21. Unfortunately, Judge Bowne also stated that the duty to correct should apply to forward-looking
statements which remain "alive" and become inaccurate due to events that occur while
the statement is still viable in the marketplace. Id. (quoting Ross v. A. H. Robins Co.,
465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y 1979)).
182. Carl W. Schneider describes statements which could possibly warrant a "duty
to update" because of an "implied representation and/or reasonable expectation of
continuity." See Schneider, Update on the Duty to Update: Did Polaroid Produce the
Instant Movie After All?, supra note 153, at 86. Schneider states that if a company
announces a long-term contract award which would double its sales, and loses that
contract months later, then the company should have to disclose the loss of that contract,
solely because of its prior disclosure. Management should be entitled, however, to
exercise its business judgment and delay disclosure of this information to assess the
impact on the business and develop strategies to counter any losses. See Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646,658 n.17 (1981). Regardless, the company's next MD&A would require
disclosure of the contract, loss if the company's liquidity or capital resources would be
affected, or if the cancellation would cause the historical financial data in the report not
to be indicative of future operating results or financial condition.
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as a safe harbor to encourage issuers to provide projections of future
performance, estimates, and forecasts. 183 A duty to continually update
all material statements, including forward-looking statements, would
discourage voluntary disclosure and undermine the SEC's efforts in this
regard.
To undermine the doctrine of timely disclosure in this manner appears
particularly short-sighted given the development of the MD&A as a
quarterly disclosure vehicle, requiring issuers to disclose all material
changes or subsequent developments in their 10-Q reports. Because
virtually all such material changes relating to forward-looking statements
would be encompassed by the MD&A, courts should refuse to eliminate
the flexibility and business judgment afforded management under the
current regulatory scheme.

2.

In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation

After the takeover by Time of Warner, the resulting company faced a
substantial debt. Time Warner embarked on a highly publicized
campaign to find international "strategic partners" who would infuse it
with billions of dollars of capital. This plan was unsuccessful, however,
and Time Warner resorted to a stock offering that had the effect of
diluting the rights of the existing shareholders, some of whom brought
this lawsuit, In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig. 184 The plaintiffs
alleged that Time Warner and certain executives misled the investing
public by making certain statements and omissions that were generally
optimistic about the progress of the "strategic partnerships" and never
indicated the actual difficulties.
The district court considered two categories of misstatements: ( 1)
press releases and public statements from the individual defendants and
(2) unofficial statements from unnamed sources given to analysts and the
press. With regard to the first category, the court found that the
statements indicating that talks were ongoing were accurate when made,
and that later attempts did not give rise to a duty to correct or update the
statements. As to the second category, the court concluded that the

183. Rule 175 generally provides a safe harbor for projections that are made with
a reasonable basis and in good faith. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (I 994). For a discussion
regarding efforts to amend the safe harbor rule, see supra Part V.B.
184. 794 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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defendants could not be held responsible for any of the unattributed
statements and that the statements were not actionable for the same
reasons that the attributed statements were not actionable. The district
court then dismissed the complaint for failure to plead adequately either
material misrepresentations or omissions attributable to the defendants,
and for failure to plead scienter adequately.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed and partially
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 185 The court discussed,
among other matters, two updating issues with regard to the attributed
statements and corporate press releases: (I) failure to disclose problems
in the strategic alliance negotiations and (2) failure to disclose the active
consideration of an alternate method of raising capital.
With regard to the first issue, the plaintiffs' theory is that the
defendants' statements hyping strategic alliances gave rise to a duty to
disclose problems in the alliance negotiations as those problems
developed. The court found, however, that the attributed public
statements "lack the sort of definitive positive projections that might
require later correction." 186 Thus, these statements "did not become
materially misleading when the talks did not proceed well." 187
Addressing the second issue of the failure to disclose alternative
methods of raising capital, the Court of Appeals found that the
information about the consideration of the stock offering alternative was
material because the offering could have a negative effect on the market
price for the company's stock. 188 The court then considered whether
there was a duty to disclose the omitted fact. The court stated:
Time Warner's public statements could have been understood by reasonable
investors to mean that the company hoped to solve the entire debt problem
through strategic alliances. Having publicly hyped strategic alliances, Time

185. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
186. Id. at 267.
187. Id. The court added in a footnote:
Although the statements are generally open-ended, there is one sense in which
they have a solid core. The statements represent as fact that serious talks with
multiple parties were ongoing. If this factual assertion ceased to be true,
defendants would have had an obligation to update their earlier statements.
But the complaint does not allege that the talks ever stopped or ceased to be
"serious," just that they eventually went poorly.
Id. at n.4. Carl W. Schneider argues that this footnote should be interpreted to require
at most "terminal" disclosures, i.e., when either an agreement is reached or the "serious"
negotiations end with no agreement. Schneider, The Duty to Update: Time Requires a
Reevaluation of Basics, supra note 153, at 2, 4. Thus, updating disclosures during the
course of ongoing negotiations should not be required. Further, it is unclear whether the
duty to update would arise if the terms being negotiated were announced but were
subsequently changed materially during the course of negotiations. Id.
188. 9 F.3d at 267.
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Warner may have come under a duty to disclose facts that would place the
statements concerning strategic alliances in a materially different light. 189

The court concluded that, "when a corporation is pursuing a specific
business goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach
for reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other
approaches to reaching the goal when those approaches are under active
and serious consideration." 190

3.

Good v. Zenith Electronics Corporation

Unfortunately, the duty to update refuses to die a rational death. In
Good v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 191 the district cowt suggested that
Zenith may have violated a duty to update certain earnings projections
which were accurate and reasonable when made, but subsequently
proved unattainable. 192 Zenith's 1988 Annual Report stated that the
company "expect[ed] further profit improvements in 1989."193 On
April 25, 1989, Zenith reported a $4 million first quarter loss. The
release stated that the company's initial forecasts had anticipated the loss
and confirmed that the company still expected profit improvement for
the full year. On July 21, 1989, Zenith reported a $13 million loss for
the second quarter. The price of Zenith stock fell significantly. The
plaintiffs alleged that Zenith's April statements confirming the initial
projections and projecting profit improvement constituted securities
fraud.194
In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Judge Bua
held that Zenith may have violated Rule lOb-5 by confirming the prior
earnings projections at a time that the company may have been in
possession of information which undermined the accuracy of such
projections. 195 It is unclear from the opinion whether Zenith actually
had actual knowledge of facts contradicting the initial projections,
because certain materials relating to this charge were submitted under

189. Id. at 268.
190. Id.
191. 751 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
I 92. Id. at 1322.
193. Id. at 1321 (quoting Statement of Uncontested Facts in Support ofDefendants'
Summary Judgment Motion at ~ 6).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1323.
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seal. Any voluntary confirmatory statements, if made at a time when the
company had reason to believe that the initial projections were no longer
accurate, would likely violate the duty not to mislead.
Unfortunately, Judge Bua went on to state that Zenith also may have
had a "duty to update" the initial projections, which were accurate when
made, "if additional information became known to the parties that
changed the meaning of the statement." 196 Because Zenith's April
statements apparently were inaccurate, Judge Bua need not have
attributed his ruling to an independent duty to update the initial
projections and his statements in this regard are dicta. 197
4.

Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc.

Although the debate is far from over, the Seventh Circuit reRaired
some of the damage in Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 98 In
Stransky, Cummins Engine Co. issued optimistic press releases regarding
its newly redesigned engines, and later discovered that warranty costs
were skyrocketing because of faulty design problems. 199
Alan
Stransky filed a class action suit for securities fraud and based the case
(at least partially) on a duty to update. The court noted that some legal
scholars have argued that a duty to update arises when a company makes
a forward-looking statement that, because of subsequent events, becomes
untrue. 200 The court emphatically stated, however, that "[t]his court
has never embraced such a theory, and we decline to do so now." 201
The Seventh Circuit explained that Rule lOb-5 implicitly precludes
liability in circumstances that arise after the speaker makes the statement.202 It commented that "the securities laws typically do not act as

I 96.
Id. at 1322.
197. Another case where the court applied the "duty to update" is In re Kulicke &
Soffa Indus. Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 1136, 1147-49 (E.D. Pa. 1990), where the jury
responded in special interrogatories that an issuer had a duty to disclose material
information which rendered a prior projected sales forecast misleading, even though
defendants made no statements supporting the projections once the projections became
unattainable. However, both the jury and the court found that defendants lacked scienter
in their failure to correct the forecast immediately. The court in In re Meridian Sec.
Litig., 772 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1991), suggested that an issuer had a duty to
correct and update between periodic reports its optimistic statements regarding certain
successful business operations after difficulties arose. However, in Capri Optics Profit
Sharing v. Digital Equip., 760 F. Supp. 227 (D. Mass. 1991), the court cited Polaroid
and rejected the claim that an issuer had a duty to disclose "additional information"
regarding expected company performance.
198. 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 1330.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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a Monday Morning Quarterback,"203 and it noted that the secunt1es
laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective. Consequently,
forward-looking statements can lead to liability only if they are
unreasonable in light of the facts known at the time.
The duty to update thus appears to have been eliminated, at least in
the Seventh Circuit. The huge question now is whether the other courts
will see the light and follow the lead of Stransky. 204
VI.

FREE RIDING INTERPRETATION

On March 18, 1994, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD) filed with the SEC certain rule changes to the NASD "freeriding" interpretation of the NASD Manual of Rules of Fair Practice. 205
These changes were approved by the SEC on December 7, 1994. 206
Some of the key changes to the interpretation include the following:

1.

Stand-by Arrangements

The prior interpretation restricted sales to "stand-by" purchasers in
certain instances by disallowing persons restricted under the prior
interpretation from having a beneficial interest in a "stand-by" account.
The new interpretation now provides that securities purchased pursuant
to a "stand-by" arrangement (an agreement to purchase securities not
purchased during the offering) are not subject to the provisions of the
interpretation if: ( 1) the "stand-by" is disclosed in the prospectus, (2)
the "stand-by" arrangement is the subject of a formal written agreement,
(3) the managing underwriter represents in writing that it was unable to
find any other purchasers for the securities, and (4) the securities

203. Id.
204. Such a trend appears to be developing already. The opinion in In re Cypress
Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995), echoes the Seventh
Circuit distaste for the duty to update: "All of Cypress forward-looking statements had
a reasonable basis at the time they were made, which is the only time that matters as far
as the securities laws are concerned." Id. at 1381.
205. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the NASD's Free-Riding
and Withholding Interpretation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34485, 59 Fed. Reg.
40,933 (August 3, 1994).
206. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the NASD's Free-Riding
and Withholding Interpretation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35059, 59 Fed. Reg.
64,455 (Dec. 7, 1994) [hereinafter NASD Release].
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purchased are restricted from sale or transfer for a period of three
months. 207

2.

Definition of Immediate Family

The old interpretation restricted immediate family members or persons
associated with broker/dealers and persons having a connection to the
offering and individuals related to banks, insurance companies, and other
institutional-type accounts, from participating in "hot issue" distributions.
The amendment to the interpretation now provides that
the prohibition shall not apply to sales to a member of the immediate family of
a person associated with a member [who] is not supported directly or indirectly
to a material extent by such person if the sale is by a broker/dealer other than
that employing the restricted person and the restricted person has no ability to
control the allocation of the hot issue. 208

3.

Venture Capital Investors

The NASD concluded that venture capital investors should be allowed
to purchase a hot issue to maintain their percentage ownership in an
entity, notwithstanding that the venture capital investor may be a
restricted person, or that such person may have a beneficial interest in
a venture capital account. The new interpretation therefore provides that
venture capital investors may purchase hot issues without implicating the
interpretation's restrictions if:
(a) there is one year of preexisting ownership in the entity;
(b) there is no increase in the investor's percentage ownership
above that held for three months prior to the filing of registration statement in connection with the initial public offering;
(c) there is a lack of special terms in connection with the purchase;
and
(d) [the] Venture Capital Investor shall not assign, sell, pledge,
hypothecate or otherwise dispose of the securities for a period
of three months following the effective date of the registration
statement in connection with the offering. 209

4.

Definition of Public Offering

The NASD concluded that the definition of "public offering"
implicated private placements of securities which do not present the

207.
208.
209.
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abuses that the interpretation was designed to guard against. The
amended interpretation therefore provides that private placements are not
within the purview of the interpretation. Specifically, the amended
interpretation defines a public offering as "any primary or secondary
distribution of securities made pursuant to a registration statement or
offering circular . . . of any kind whatsoever except any offering made
pursuant to an exemption under §4(1), 4(2) or 4(6) of the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, or pursuant to Rule 504 ... or Rule 506."210
VIL

ROAD SHOWS

Road shows are an integral part of the public offering process. They
serve a useful function as the issuer and its principal officers are
displayed before potential investors. This leads to incisive questioning
by experts and produces, in some respects, a negotiated transaction.
Lawyers generally play a small or nonexistent part in either the road
show or its preparation. Cautious issuer counsel frequently advises the
client to confine its presentations at the road show to material included
in the registration statement, to refrain from making predictions, and not
to distribute other materials. There is very little case law, and few
formal SEC rulings, dealing with statements made at road shows. Many
of the class action securities fraud suits brought in the past few years
have specifically alleged that the road show is used as a vehicle to create
demand for the securities by painting an extremely positive picture of the
issuer and by having the issuer and underwriter both make forecasts that
the issuer will enjoy continued profit growth.
In In re Hyperion Sec. Litig., 211 the plaintiffs attempted to bolster
their allegations of securities fraud through excerpts of information-scripts and slides--used during the road shows. The court agreed
that the "roadshow scripts were more optimistic about risks and returns
than the prospectuses." 212 Despite this, the court, looking at the total
mix of information available and applying the bespeaks caution doctrine,
held that the plaintiffs could not "predicate their claims on inferences
drawn from statements made during the roadshows, if, as here, those

210.
211.
212.

Id. at 64,937.
(1995-96 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,i 98,906 (July 14, 1995).
Id. at 93,362.
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inferences are contradicted by specific disclosures in the prospectuses. "213
CONCLUSION

Major developments have recently occurred in the law surrounding
disclosure. The SEC has not been the principal catalyst, but instead the
courts and Congress have created these developments. Both are clearly
signaling that there is far too much securities fraud litigation. Volatile
markets----especially steep declines-----have generally prompted a rash of
litigation. Based on the more limiting court decisions and the Reform
Act, it is likely that the litigation explosion will be reduced.

213.
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APPENDIX A
CAUTIONARY STATEMENTS REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS MADE IN REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS

Genus, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Feb. 16, 1996, available in
LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File:
"This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements that involve
risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results may differ
significantly from the results discussed in the forward-looking statements. Factors that might cause such differences include, but are not
limited to, the "Risk Factors" described below."
CNS, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Mar. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS,
COMPNY Library, FILING File:
"An investment in the Common Stock offered hereby involves a high
degree of risk. In addition to the other information contained in this
Prospectus, prospective investors should carefully consider the following
risk factors relating to the business of the Company before making an
investment. This Prospectus, including the information incorporated by
reference herein, contains forward-looking statements within the meaning
of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Actual results could differ significantly from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result, in
part, of the risk factors set forth below. In connection with the forwardlooking statements which appear in these disclosures, prospective
purchasers of the Common Stock offered hereby should carefully review
the factors set forth in this Prospectus under 'Risk Factors."'
Molecular Biosystems, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, Apr. 10, 1996,
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File:
"In addition to the other information contained in or incorporated by
reference into this Prospectus, the following factors should be carefully
considered in evaluating an investment in the Common Stock offered by
this Prospectus. This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements
that involve risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results could
differ materially from those discussed in these forward-looking
statements. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences
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include, but are not limited to, those discussed in the following section
and in 'Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations' and 'Business'."
Electronic Data Systems Holding Corp., S-4 Registration Statement, Apr.
22, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File:
"This Solicitation Statement/Prospectus contains certain forwardlooking statements and information relating to EDS that are based on the
beliefs of GM or EDS management as well as assumptions made by and
information currently available to GM or EDS management. When used
in this document, the words "anticipate," "believe," "estimate" and
"expect" and similar expressions, as they relate to GM, EDS or GM or
EDS management, are intended to identify forward-looking statements.
Such statements reflect the current views of GM or EDS with respect to
future events and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions, including the risk factors described in this Solicitation Statement/Prospectus. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties
materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual
results may vary materially from those described herein as anticipated,
believed, estimated or expected. Neither GM nor EDS intends to update
these forward-looking statements."
Hambrecht & Quist Group, Inc., S-1 Registration Statement, June 20,
1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, FILING File:
"This Prospectus contains forward-looking statements that involve
risks and uncertainties. Actual results could differ materially from those
discussed in the forward-looking statements as a result of certain factors,
including those set forth below and elsewhere in this Prospectus. The
following factors should be considered carefully in addition to the other
information contained in this Prospectus before purchasing the common
stock offered hereby."
The UniMark Group, Inc., S-3 Registration Statement, June 14, 1996,
available in LEXIS, COtvIPNY Library, FILING File:
"The discussion in this Prospectus contains forward-looking statements
that involve risks and uncertainties. The Company's actual results could
differ significantly from those discussed herein. Factors that could cause
or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to, those
discussed in "Risk Factors," "Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations" and "Business," as well
as those discussed elsewhere in this Prospectus. Statements contained
in this Prospectus that are not historical facts are forward-looking
statements that are subject to the safe harbor created by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. A number of important
factors could cause the Company's actual results for 1996 and beyond
to differ materially from those expressed in any forward-looking
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statements made by, or on behalf of, the Company. These factors
include, without limitation, those listed below in 'Risk Factors'."
APPENDIXB
CAUTIONARY "SAFE HARBOR" LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN PRESS
RELEASES PURSUANT TO THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995

Motorola Reports Higher Sales and Earnings for the Full Year 1995,
Business Wire, Inc., Jan. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY
Library, ALLNWS File:
'"Safe Harbor' statement under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: The statements under "Review and Outlook" and
the other statements which are not historical facts contained in this
release are forward looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties, including, but not limited to, product demand and market acceptance risks, the effect of economic conditions, the impact of competitive
products and pricing, product development, commercialization and
technological difficulties, capacity and supply constraints or difficulties,
the results of financing efforts, actual purchases under agreements, the
effect of the Company's accounting policies, and other risks detailed in
the Company's Securities and Exchange Commission filings."
Motorola Reports Higher First Quarter Results, Business Wire, Inc.,
Apr. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File:
'"Safe Harbor' statement under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: The statements quoted in "Review and Outlook"
and about the Iridium financing negotiations are forward looking and the
continuation of the factors listed in the first paragraphs of "Review and
Outlook" and "General Corporate" as well as product and technology
development and commercialization risks and uncertainties, the outcome
of these financing negotiations and the factors listed on pages F-10 and
F-11 of Motorola's 1996 proxy statement appendix and other SEC
filings could cause Motorola's actual results to differ materially from
those statements."
Intel Fourth Quarter Outlook, Business Wire, Inc., Nov. 6, 1996,
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File:
"The above statements contained in this outlook are forward-looking
statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. In addition
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to the factors discussed above, among the other factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially are the following: business conditions
and growth in the personal computer industry and general economy;
change in customer order patterns, including timing of delivery and
changes in seasonal fluctuations in PC buying patterns; competitive
factors, such as rival chip architectures, competing software-compatible
microprocessors, acceptance of new products and price pressures; risk of
inventory obsolescence due to shifts in market demand; variations in
inventory valuation; timing of software industry product introductions;
continued success in technological advances, including the manufacturing
ramp; excess or shortage of manufacturing capacity; risks associated with
foreign operations; changes in the mix of microprocessor speeds and
related motherboards; costs and yield issues associated with production
at factories; litigation involving intellectual property and consumer
issues; and other risk factors listed from time to time in the company's
SEC reports, including but not limited to the report on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 29, 1996."
Zebra [Technologies Corporation] Announces First Quarter Financial
Results, PR Newswire Ass'n Inc., April 24, 1996, available in LEXIS,
COMPNY Library, ALLNWS File:
"The estimates contained in this release are forward looking statements
subject to the safe harbor created by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. Management cautioned that these projections are
estimates of future performance and are highly dependent upon a variety
of important factors which could cause actual results to differ materially
from the estimate. These factors include the acceptance of the
company's printer and software products by the market and product
offerings made by its competitors. Profits will be affected by the
company's ability to control manufacturing and operating costs. Due to
the company's large investment portfolio, interest rate conditions will
also have an impact on results, as will foreign exchange rates due to the
large percentage of the company's sales in international markets.
Readers of this press release are referred to filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and specifically Zebra's prospectus of
December 7, 1995 for further discussions of factors that could affect
Zebra's future results."
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